A poem for you on the last day of Nowruz

Today is the last day of Nowruz (Iranian New Year), called “13 Bedar” which means something like “getting rid of the 13th”. I wrote a poem for you, in 13 parts:

1. my grandparents live in Khorasan their marriage was arranged they grow sour cherries in their garden when we visit they make meatless dishes

2. in Iran you have to step into traffic that looks like it will hit you and if you don’t then you will never cross the street

3. when I smell gasoline I think of Tehran

4. my parents met in Berkeley at meetings of leftist expats hoping for the revolution that never came to Iran

5. my mom was Rafiq Niloofar that means comrade my dad was the consummate liberal he kept them honest and had good taste in socialists

6. my family moved to Illinois instead of LA figuring they’d rather be around white people than Persians turns out there are LA Persians everywhere

7. in elementary school I was embarrassed to invite my friends over bc I knew my mom would bring out fruit and not fruit rollups

8. when that South Park about the Persians came out I was grateful just to be depicted as tacky effeminate buffoons and not terrorists

9. after 3 seasons of Shahs of Sunset I have changed my mind

10. when I was 14 my grandparents gave me a gold Iran shaped necklace I don’t wear it anymore I don’t like to reinforce the stereotype that Iranians love gold

11. “I am Persian” means “I am distancing myself from the government of Iran” “I’m Iranian” means “don’t bomb it”

12. my mom loses friends over politics she’s ok with it I think I turned out a little more like her than she intended

13. we got fish for Nowruz it broke her heart to throw them in the lake on 13 bedar thinking it’s too bad they won’t live but then again who does

The Anti-Defamation League’s profile of yours truly

Everyone needs a little encouragement now and then: A friend of mine has discovered that the Anti-Defamation League is keeping tabs on little old me. The ADL’s stated purpose is to combat anti-Semitism in the US, but the group often departs from that mission in order to undermine criticism of Israel by smearing pro-Palestinian activists and intellectuals as bigots.

Tellingly, the ADL found nothing anti-Semitic or factually incorrect in any of my commentaries for Iran’s Press TV. The profile actually gives a fairly accurate account of my arguments – but not before implying my guilt-by-association with the English-language news network and its inexcusable (if unwitting) history of confusing genuine anti-Semites in the West – like former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke – with principled critics of Zionism and Israeli policy.

A couple of media interviews with me

I was on Iran’s Press TV this past week discussing US public opinion about the War on Terror – you can watch that clip here.

I also returned to the Progressive Radio Network with a couple of my SJP comrades to talk BDS and Israeli apartheid for a full hour – stream or download here (interview starts at around minute 7:45).

Learning to be Not Quite White (Part II of III)

In my last post, I sketched a phenomenological account of my experience of being “Not Quite White” as an Iranian American in the United States.

Recall that in The Racial Contract, Charles W. Mills stresses that no possible division within the category of “nonwhite” even approaches the radical nature of the white-nonwhite split. But the categories, he insists, must be “fuzzified” to allow for not only shades of nonwhiteness (including blackness), but also the historical instability of whiteness itself.

It has not always been the case that all people of European descent, including Jews, were treated as “fully” white (i.e., Anglo-Saxon). The “fuzzy” space occupied by Irish and Italian Americans into the early 20th century was a liminal position, an in-between place; I have lived my life in an even more liminal position, just on the other side of the white-nonwhite split.

It’s precisely because the racial and ethnic identity of Middle Easterners in the United States is so “fuzzy”, so shrouded in ambiguity, that my account has the potential to reveal something very fundamental about the experience of difference. So I’d like to pick up where I left off in my previous post, to develop further the phenomenology of Not Quite White, again drawing primarily on my own memory and experience.

Growing up in Illinois as a child of Iranian immigrants, the Persian and English languages demarcated not just my vocabulary, but social space itself: Persian marked the space of home, of family, and of comfort, while English was the medium through which I ventured out into the uncertain world of school, sports, television, films, and friends. Most things had a Persian name and an English name, but sometimes things were so tied to their cultural context—the dynamics of friend groups at school, or my parents’ strict ban on sleepovers—that they were difficult to translate into the other.

For most of my childhood, I couldn’t or didn’t want to bridge the gap between the world of my family and the world of my peers. I feel I’m only now excavating those memories and that history, and it’s only now that I have the language to speak the otherwise incommunicable, even the repressed.

As I mentioned previously, as a child, I had no way of linking this tension or incommensurability with questions of “white” or “black”—I only knew that I was neither of these, and that I was embarrassed to bring my friends home. As I delve into my memories from this time, it’s quite clear that what I feared most (and tried hardest to prevent) was for my family’s Iranianness to be revealed for the outside world (most importantly, my friends) to see.

The prospect of “bridging the gap” was, for me, the prospect of being “outed” as not being American enough: It offered nothing but humiliation. I was afraid my friends would sniffle and sneer at my Iranian lunch—dishes like dolme, stuffed grape leaves, and adas polow, lentil rice. I now find this food scrumptious, but for a good chunk of elementary school, more often than not, I’d discretely throw it away.

I was afraid my friends would come over to our house and see that we had no video games, no Nerf guns, no sugary cereal, and no soda. I was afraid my mom would bring us a spread of fruit and nuts (she always did), and that my friends wouldn’t eat any (they almost never did). I was afraid they would discover, to their horror, that I wasn’t allowed to watch television (except for PBS, of course), a fact I hid somewhat effectively by catching up on cartoons every Saturday morning at the house of my ever-indulgent grandmother.

So in my own interactions with peers, at school and elsewhere, I made a conscious effort to erase from my persona any traces of difference. Of course, my anxieties didn’t always stem directly or necessarily from the fact that my parents were Iranian immigrants; but my parents, as they now tell me (with some regret, having read my previous post), made very little effort to assimilate into mainstream US culture.

They distrusted not only the food and media Americans consumed, but Americans themselves: “Sleepovers” at friends’ houses were out of the question, because who knows what kind of crazy people with guns one might find in the house of an American? I took my parents’ policies not only as a rejection of my friends’ culture, but also (implicitly) as a threat directed at me personally, as an American: namely, that I, too, should take care not to internalize the behaviors and values of my friends, lest I bring them home with me.

This isn’t to say, however, that my parents were totally oblivious to the tensions of growing up with my ethnicity in the United States. One day, while I was in middle school, my mom gave me a pair of tweezers and taught me how to pluck my eyebrows. On the whole, Iranians (and Middle Easterners in general) are known for being a hairy bunch—not only compared to whites, but virtually all other ethnic groups as well. Although I wasn’t fully aware of this at the time, the more a phenotype deviates from the Northern European ideal, the more white supremacist culture devalues those “deviant” characteristics, deriding them as unattractive and abnormal.

Iranians and other Middle Easterners are, by and large, the most European-looking of the non-European ethnicities, but the differences that do exist between Europeans and Middle Easterners are marked: These include darker skin tones, ranging from “tan” (meaning tanned white skin) to cappuccino to milk chocolate; shorter statures; and the early appearance and abundance of body hair.

On this day, my mom was concerned with my nascent “unibrow”, the hair between the eyebrows that supposedly renders the brows one long strip. This is a characteristic that, I now know, is ridiculed in the media and in everyday conversation. Mockery of unibrows is particularly prominent in racist/sexist discussions of how Middle Eastern women look, where unibrows are often brought up as evidence that Middle Eastern women are brown and ugly.

Whether my mother knew it or not (recent conversations suggest that she didn’t), she had formally introduced me to a harsh reality of being Not Quite White in mainstream US culture: While we as nonwhites measure our attractiveness and desirability against an impossible white supremacist standard of beauty, we as Middle Eastern nonwhites are perhaps uniquely situated to mask or obscure our physical difference—to “pass” as white.

I was about to finish the fifth grade when my father gave me my first electric razor (James Bond uses it, he told me). None of the boys in my class—white, black, east Asian—seemed to have hair anywhere but the tops of their heads: not on their faces, and certainly not on their legs. A year or so earlier, a young boy, redheaded, freckled, and white as a sheet, saw my legs on the playground and called me “wolfman”.

I was in sixth grade when I first tried to use James Bond’s razor to shave my legs: I wanted to be rid of this curse, this overgrown shrubbery that threatened to cast me, for the rest of my life, as a wolfman—more animal than human. Over the years, I’ve tried various methods of hair removal on various parts of my body. Some hurt a little, some hurt a lot. I still pluck my eyebrows every night, and more recently I’ve started plucking them along the bottom as well, to make them look thinner and less “bushy”.

There’s an operative assumption in this and all other attempts at downplaying my ethnic identity, to which I will return: that I can control other people’s perception of me, including their perception of my ethnicity.

Body hair can be removed, or at least managed. But not everything is so mutable: A hair is a hair, but (to quote Marlo Stanfield) “my name is my name.” My name has an interesting history that’s worth recounting. On my maternal grandmother’s insistence, my name was to be an ethnic Persian (that is, not Arabic) name. In the Shahnameh (“Book of Kings”) of Ferdowsi, the national epic of Iran and the Persian-speaking world, Kumars is the name of the first human, who had the foresight to also make himself the first king.

My parents, for their part, tested this spelling out on their white friends, to see how they would pronounce it. They reportedly all got it right the first time, which by my count makes them the only white people in history to have done so. In fact, American English speakers pronounce “Ku” not as “Kyoo”, but as “Koo”. This is due in no small part to the common Indian name Kumar, which many Americans recognize from—if nowhere else—the buddy comedy Harold and Kumar Go to White Castle.

The “mars” is even trickier: Its correct pronunciation is the complete opposite of the English pronunciation of Mars (the planet and Roman god of war): The “a” is the same as in “cat”, the “r” is rolled, and the “s” is pronounced like “sass”.

Coaching a well-meaning friend or acquaintance through the “authentic” (correct) Persian pronunciation of my name is just that—work. It’s an ordeal. Without exception, those who undertake the challenge either fail or lapse immediately upon succeeding.

For most of my life, I never corrected anyone’s pronunciation of my name—not for lack of patience, exactly, but for fear that it would call attention to my Iranianness (As a child, I used to wish my name were Jason, which I now know to be an almost comically white name). As a result, some of my oldest friends still call me “Koo-Mars”: Despite now knowing better, they can’t shake the habit.

It’s only in the last five years or so that I’ve begun to break my own habit of quietly acquiescing to whatever embarrassing butchery follows the teacher’s longest pause during roll call. I’ve told myself the fact that no one I meet can pronounce my name doesn’t bother me, that I know better than to take it personally—but the truth is that it bothers me to no end. I rarely remember the names of people I meet, because as soon as I introduce myself to someone, instead of listening for their name, I’m already bracing to repeat mine, to spell it, to explain its origin to my well-intentioned interlocutor.

To make matters simpler—for others, too, but mostly for myself—I’ve decided that my name has a correct mispronunciation in English: As long as it’s “Kyoo” and not “Koo”, I let the rest slide. This struggle over my name is as much an internal struggle as it is an external one—for two decades, I told myself I took no pride in my name, because I took no pride in the Iranian identity it stands for.

And just as I failed to be assertive about how my name is spoken, so too did I fail to claim anything like a positive Iranian identity to fill in the gap left by my alienation from white Americanness. But with maturity and reflection has come the realization that while I’m frustrated by the difficulty people have with my name, I’m not ashamed of it.

In stark contrast to East Asian immigrants in the United States, immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia generally don’t give their children Anglo-Saxon first names: My name is a testament to my parents’ refusal to assimilate into white Americanness, and today, more than ever, I’m proud and grateful that my name isn’t Jason Salehi.

So in the final entry in this series, I’d like to take up this question: Can “Iranian American” ever be more than a hyphen, an in-between place, a signifier of lack? In other words: If I’ve disavowed part of my identity, can it also be reclaimed?

Guest Commentary: Iran & America – Is the nuclear deal really about nuclear weapons?

In this week’s guest commentary, author and friend of TRF Navid Zarrinnal reflects on the so-called Iranian nuclear deal and the prospect of detente between Iran and the United States. The “Iranian threat” was never about nukes, he argues, but rather, the country’s independence from the Western powers. Those looking to explain the recent cooling of tensions should instead turn their eyes to the neoliberal leanings of the new Rouhani administration.

– KS

For over a decade now, the American media, government, public intellectuals and the public at large have been anxious over Iran’s nuclear program. Government officials, media outlets and public experts have insisted that once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may target Israel, America’s Arab allies, or even the United States itself; this necessitates, they claim, economic sanctions or a preemptive military strike on Iran.

International English-language media, in covering Iran’s nuclear program, has failed to assuage these anxieties. Daily news, including reports on the most recent negotiations between Iran and P5+1, give the impression that the anxiety over Iran’s nuclear program really turns on a potential weapon that would threaten global security. Perhaps this is inevitable, because daily news and reports from the ground are intended to provide descriptive, factual information on current global affairs.

However, analysts and public experts who are supposed to dig deeper have failed, with some exceptions, to provide a sufficiently critical voice on the nuclear debate. They too analyze Iran and the “international community” dispute as if it is fundamentally over the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons.

The “Iranian threat” however is not about nuclear weapons; it is about something else entirely: Iran’s independence from the dominant political-economic order sought by the U.S. and its closest allies.

The threat Iranian independence poses is not new, and neither are economic sanctions. The conflict between Iran and the “international community”—a misnomer for the U.S. and allied countries—dates back to the 1950’s. Situated in the broader global movement towards decolonization, Iranians under the leadership of Mohammad Mossadeq attempted to establish a constitutional democracy and reclaim their oil from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now British Petroleum or BP); British-led economic sanctions and a CIA-assisted coup followed.

Again in 1979, the Iranian revolution became a major event in the history of decolonization and Third World sovereignty, resulting in the establishment of an Islamic government, which stubbornly resisted American political and economic domination even at great cost to its own stability. And with this stubborn resistance came economic sanctions and indirect military intervention via America’s old ally—turned foe—Saddam Hussein. In the 1990’s and 2000’s, the Islamic Republic continued its refusal to be subsumed under a U.S.-dominated world order; the September 11 attacks, though having no connection to the Islamic Republic, coupled with Iran’s nuclear program and the Ahmadinejad government’s foreign policy, intensified the threat of the “military option” and “crippling” economic sanctions.

Economic and political measures were thus employed historically—during Mossadeq’s premiership and the Islamic Republic’s rule—to thwart Iranian independence.

This is not to underestimate the so-called nuclear issue as the primary source of global anxiety, however; with enough attention devoted to the nuclear issue, the real threat—Iranian independence—is substituted by an imaginary threat, Iran’s nonexistent nuclear weapons.

As an example, we can look at the world of high politics. State officials like Benjamin Netanyahu, who lie irresponsibly to gain public support for their misguided policies on Iran, begin to believe in their own lies. These officials resemble, rather imperfectly, Eric Cartman in the South Park episode “Jewpacabra.” Cartman knowingly lies about the existence of a dangerous creature, Jewpacabra, that attacks Christian children on Easter, and with enough public anxieties generated around his lie, he begins to believe in the made-up creature himself and fears it immensely. Netanyahu and his devotees in the U.S. government too appear to fear an Iranpacabra of their own making.

Netanyahu and his devotees are becoming increasingly isolated on the international stage, however. The Rouhani administration with its astute foreign policy is putting great pressure on the Obama government to pursue constructive negotiations and push the military option off the table.

Additionally, the economic and political problems that face the U.S. government domestically and internationally are of sufficient magnitude to make negotiations with Iran attractive. The “War on Terror” has exhausted the American military, while the U.S. economy is under great distress. Add to that Iran’s growing strength as a regional power that may prove helpful in resolving political crisis in neighboring states like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, though not necessarily to the benefit of local populations.

Economically too, the Rouhani administration seems to have a greater degree of openness to pursuing neoliberal policies; this economic position makes negotiations with world powers, including the United States, even more attractive but not necessarily to the benefit of the Iranian working class.

The closed-door negotiations in Geneva were concluded on November 24, 2013, and a textual agreement was reached. The agreement places restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, but retains their right to uranium enrichment, in exchange for limited sanction relief. However, the nuclear deal is a distraction from more crucial political and economic issues to be negotiated, like the neoliberalization of Iran and limited U.S.-Iranian political cooperation in the Middle East.

Claims to the future state of U.S.-Iran relations remain speculative. But one observation can be made with reasonable certainty: the old animus between Iran and the United States—34 years of combative politics rooted in post-World War II history—has come to a closure.

Guest Commentary: How We Got Here – A History of Missed Opportunities with Iran

In this week’s TRF guest commentary, author Sina Toossi lays out the history and geopolitics of the so-called nuclear dispute between Iran and the US. It’s not just that the sanctions aren’t “working”, he argues: Iran simply doesn’t have a nuclear weapons program, at least not if you ask the IAEA or any of the 17 US intelligence agencies, and the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have, over and over, turned down Iranian offers of detente and peaceful enrichment.

– KS

Negotiators from Iran and six major world powers convened again in Geneva this week, and although a deal was not reached, prospects for resolving the decade-long impasse over the Iranian nuclear program are better than they have ever been.

Led by newly elected President Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s recent diplomatic overtures to the West have led many analysts to conclude that Washington’s long-standing sanctions policy against Tehran has finally worked. This has led to calls for even more “crippling” sanctions against Iran during this sensitive time of heightened diplomacy, with proponents arguing that this will get the “already down” Iranians to totally capitulate on all outstanding differences with the West.

This might sound reasonable to casual observers. But the sanctions hawks are overlooking more than a little history.

Missed Opportunities

The foremost fact about the Iranian nuclear program—one that might surprise people who constantly hear about that Iranian “nuclear weapons program,” or that the Iranians are forever “six months away from having the bomb”—is that Iran does not even have a nuclear weapons program.

There has never really been any serious doubt about this either, at least as far as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is concerned. The IAEA’s regular reports on Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities, which it has intensively inspected for nearly 10 years, have never provided any evidence of Iran developing nuclear weapons. Western intelligence agencies too have long maintained that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program.

Iran’s nuclear activities first came to international spotlight in 2002, when the Iranians were allegedly caught “red-handed” with an illicit nuclear program. However, while Iran was indeed pursing a nuclear program at this time, it was not, as per the tenets of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), required to disclose any of its nuclear facilities until six months before nuclear material would actually be introduced to any of its facilities, a threshold that was never reached.

Regardless, the Iranians arguably went above and beyond their international obligations to ease international concern during this time and, under the reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami, froze all of their nuclear enrichment activities. Additionally, they signed onto the NPT’s “additional protocol,” which required the country to give advance notice of future facilities to the IAEA and to adhere to more intensive inspections.

In 2003, the Iranians went on to lay the framework for negotiations aimed at a grand compromise with the United States. In a letter sent through the Swiss Embassy to Washington, the Iranians put almost all matters of dispute with the United States on the negotiating table.

The offer, which the Bush administration refused, would have seen Iran agreeing to full cooperation on nuclear safeguards, ending “material support” to Palestinian resistance groups such as Hamas, and accepting the Saudi Arab peace initiative, which effectively recognized Israel by advocating a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In return, the Iranians wanted recognition of Iran’s legitimate security interests in the region, a halt to hostile U.S. behavior, recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil, and the abolishment of all sanctions. In effect, they wanted what they have always wanted since the 1979 Islamic Revolution: for the United States to recognize the Islamic Republic as a legitimate government and to acknowledge its role and interests as a regional power in the Middle East.

The Iranians resumed enrichment in 2005 after what they said was the failure of European-led negotiations to build confidence and reach a resolution that would allow for peaceful enrichment on Iranian soil—a right Iran claimed under the NPT. The Iranians went their own way, dismissing Western “red lines” and expanding their nuclear enrichment program. This resulted in the first round of UN Security Council sanctions being imposed on Iran in 2006.

Soon after this, an effort was made by then-Secretary General of the IAEA, Mohammad Elbaradei, to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff. Elbaradei suggested a deal wherein Iran would give up industrial-scale enrichment and limit its enrichment program to a small-scale pilot facility, and agree to import higher enriched nuclear fuel from Russia. Iran actually responded positively to this proposal, but the offer was dismissed by the Bush administration, which vowed not to approve of any deal that allowed enrichment inside Iran.

In 2010, another diplomatic opportunity arose that prominent political scientist Stephen Walt has said could have been “a step towards the solution of the whole Iranian nuclear program.” Brokered by Turkey and Brazil, rising powers that wanted to enter the world stage by helping to solve the Iranian nuclear dispute, the deal would have seen Iran exchanging large amounts of its stockpiles of low-enriched uranium for small amounts of medium-enriched uranium.

Iran has long argued that it needs medium-enriched uranium (which can be converted to weapons-grade uranium much more easily) to operate a medical research reactor in Tehran that creates vitally needed cancer medicine. To the surprise of many, Iran accepted the deal, and the stage was suddenly set for a potential solution to the Iranian nuclear impasse.

However, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton quickly poured cold water on the whole affair and condemned the deal, worrying that it would undermine support for new sanctions the United States was pushing for against Iran. These new sanctions were soon ushered through the UN Security Council by the United States, where Turkey and Brazil (then rotating members of the council) voted against them.

The Changing Landscape

The argument that sanctions have prompted Iran’s more conciliatory stance today ignores these past overtures. At several junctures in the past 10 years—well before current sanctions were in place—Iran put more concessions on the table than most analysts think it would be willing to offer today. In trying to ascertain what the next diplomatic steps with Iran should be, U.S. diplomats and decision-makers should be cognizant of these previous missed opportunities.

Iran’s “new” strategy is more a consequence of the election of Hassan Rouhani than of sanctions. Rouhani ran on a platform stressing international reconciliation and serious diplomacy aimed at resolving concerns over the country’s nuclear program. He has since brought back more or less the same reformist team that was responsible for the concessions Iran offered 10 years ago—the most it has ever been willing to make.

So far, the Supreme Leader seems to have given Rouhani’s effort his blessing. But there is no reason to believe that if the Iranian people had voted for a more hardline candidate back in June—such as Saeed Jalili, who ran on platform of resistance to Western demands—Iran’s nuclear policy would be the same as it is right now under Rouhani.

There are also a few new geo-strategic factors that make a negotiated settlement with Iran more likely today. Perhaps foremost is that regional power dynamics have drastically changed in the Middle East compared to what they were 10 years ago. Iranian influence now stretches from Afghanistan to Lebanon—thanks in no small part to the U.S.-led wars of the past decade and a half.

But the United States and Iran now have more shared interests in the region than differences, particularly in preserving a stable Iraq and Afghanistan, checking the spread of Wahhabi extremism, and ensuring the free flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf, among others.

While there are certainly elements in the Iranian government that would not support any kind of cooperation between the United States and Iran, key Iranian officials and stakeholders have again and again proven their willingness to work with the United States where Washington’s agenda has overlapped with Tehran’s.

Examples abound. They include Iranian support for U.S. efforts in Bosnia in the 1990s (Iran sent arms to the Bosnians at the request of the Clinton administration, and the critical support Iran lent the United States during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (they helped oust both governments and have propped up new governments to replace them).

Iran has also at times offered the United States olive branches that were turned down. In the early 1990s the United States reneged on its part of a deal by refusing to release frozen Iranian assets after Iran mediated the release of American hostages in Lebanon. An offer by pragmatic former President Hashemi Rafsanjani for U.S. oil companies to invest in Iran’s oil fields was also spurned by President Clinton in the mid-1990s. Then of course there are the numerous missed opportunities at nuclear diplomacy since.

The United States has long sought to isolate Iran, but it has failed. The Islamic Republic continues to exist more than 30 years after the revolution that created it, and plays a bigger role in the Middle East today than it ever has before. With the rise of theocratic governments throughout the region, the U.S. policy of not recognizing Islamist governments is simply no longer feasible. And given the potential benefits of rapprochement with Iran, it’s not advisable either.

A “Win-Win” Deal

What the Iranians want is U.S. recognition, both for their government and for their legitimate interests in the Middle East—this is what their 2003 proposal was about, and it’s what their offer for talks now is about. Now that the United States is negotiating a potentially similar offer from Iran—even as Iran’s position in the region is far stronger, and its nuclear program far more developed than it was 10 years ago—Washington simply cannot afford to let this opportunity fall through.

It is critical for policymakers to understand at this point that sanctions—as a tool to coerce other nations to change their policies against their interests—are rarely effective. While sanctions have badly damaged Iran’s economy, the Iranians have adapted accordingly, a process that has been painful but not fatal. Most importantly, sanctions have failed to change Iran’s nuclear calculus, with the Iranians essentially offering the same thing now that they have been offering for the past decade.

Iran’s leaders are prepared to limit Iran’s domestic enrichment to the 5-percent level, sign onto the additional protocol of the NPT, subject their nuclear facilities to more rigorous inspection, and convert their existing stockpiles of 20-percent enriched uranium (which can more easily be converted to weapons-grade 90-percent enriched uranium) to fuel rods. In exchange, the Iranians want what they have always wanted: a recognition of their right to enrich uranium on their own soil (at the 5-percent level), the removal of sanctions, and a clear endgame to the dispute that puts to rest their worry that the United States is really after regime change.

If some sort of agreement with Iran over its nuclear program reached, the stage will be set to engage Iran on other regional issues. A mutually beneficial rapprochement between Iran and the United States could very well serve as the best security guarantee for American interests in the region for years to come.

Sina Toossi holds BA degrees in Economics and Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is currently a graduate student in Comparative and Regional Studies at American University’s School of International Service, with a regional concentration in the Middle East. He is currently an intern at the Institute for Policy Studies.

A version of this article originally appeared on Foreign Policy in Focus.

The US and its allies are already at war with Syria

Since the Obama administration announced plans for a bombing campaign in response to an alleged chemical weapons attack by the Syrian government, there’s been a flurry of skepticism in the US media regarding the administration’s case for war.

Those who get their news from sources other than NPR and the cable networks have probably read and heard commentators pointing out that a military strike without Congressional or UN Security council approval violates both US and international law; that Americans overwhelmingly oppose any such action; that the Obama administration tried and failed to call off the UN probe ordered by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon; that the evidence that Bashar al-Assad’s government carried out the attack is far from conclusive; that interviews with victims of a previous chemical weapons attack, conducted by a separate UN investigation, indicate that Syrian rebels were responsible; that residents of Ghouta, the Damascus suburb hit by this latest attack, have given similar accounts implicating rebels; that recent history strongly suggests that any military intervention – from cruise missile strikes to a full-scale land invasion – will likely prolong and intensify the bloodshed, even expanding it beyond Syria’s borders.

And, of course, we know to take the US government’s righteous indignation over the use of chemical weapons with more than a few grains of salt.

There are many excellent reports and articles addressing these points, and I encourage everyone to read them. But to see how all of these different pieces – the doubts, the conflicting reports, the apparent eagerness for war on the part of the Obama administration – actually fit together, we also have to look at the material base of the conflict, at the economic and geopolitical actors behind the militarization of what could have developed into a mass protest movement.

So at the risk of oversimplifying, I’d like to try and sketch a one-dimensional “big picture” of the regional and global relationships fueling the war. 

While Syria itself doesn’t have significant oil or natural gas reserves, the country is of immense economic and strategic importance as a transit point for Middle East oil. As Asia Times reporter Pepe Escobar noted in April of last year, Assad agreed to a deal with Iran and Iraq – several months before the first major protests in March 2011 – to build a pipeline from Iran’s South Pars fields, through Iraq, Syria, and possibly Lebanon, reaching Europe via the Mediterranean. “The European Union’s supreme paranoia is to become a hostage of Russia’s Gazprom,” Escobar writes. “The Iran-Iraq-Syria gas pipeline would be essential to diversify Europe’s energy supplies away from Russia.” Crucially, the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline would bypass Turkey, which has made no secret of its ambitions to be the nexus for Russian, Central Asian, Iranian, and Iraqi oil on its way to European markets.

In a recent Guardian column that’s well worth reading, Nafeez Ahmed points out that just two years earlier, Assad had refused a Qatari proposal for a pipeline running from Qatar’s North Field – which borders the South Pars fields – through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, and from there to Europe. This arrangement cuts out both Russia and Iran, Syria’s two closest allies; indeed, Ahmed quotes Assad as saying he turned down Qatar “to protect the interests of [his] Russian ally, which is Europe’s top supplier of natural gas.”

As is often pointed out, Russia and Iran have an interest in bankrolling Assad’s war machine. Saudi Arabia, however, sees Iran as its biggest rival for regional dominance, both politically and economically, and the Assad government as Iran’s key ally in the Arab world. Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have been training, funding, and arming sectarian militias in Syria since the early days of the uprising – which, contrary to the dominant media narrative, was marred from the start by substantial violence on both sides.

But those three governments are just the most active of the more than three dozen countries involved in illegal arms shipments to the so-called rebels, including the US, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Argentina, and Brazil.

Of the aforementioned countries, almost two-thirds are part of NATO, and together they form nearly half of the NATO membership. In this case, the regional imperial ventures of the Saudis, Qatar, and Turkey coincide with the longtime strategy of the Western nations to secure markets for the multinational corporations that operate out of them. These are NATO’s “private partners“: Energy companies like Chevron, BP, and ExxonMobil; defense contractors like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon; financial giants like Barclays and Deutsche Bank, and so on.

From Europe’s point of view, a new regime in Damascus could alleviate its dependence on Russian oil by agreeing to deals like the pipeline proposed by Qatar. With Syria’s full cooperation, instead of being gouged by Gazprom, the Europeans would likely land far more lucrative deals from the likes of the Persian Gulf monarchies.

If this sounds like a conspiracy theory, consider that the UK and France – the nations that led the charge to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 – get quite a lot of their oil from Libya. Among the companies who gained the most from Qaddafi’s ouster were the UK’s BP and France’s Total. These two countries, which have always had the interests of Middle Easterners at heart, have been planning regime change in Syria since before the so-called Arab Spring even began: In an interview for French TV, former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas recalled that, on a trip to England in 2009, he met

with top British officials, who confessed to me that they were preparing something in Syria. Britain was organizing an invasion of rebels into Syria. They even asked me, although I was no longer minister for foreign affairs, if I would like to participate.

Dumas insists that he replied, “I’m French, that doesn’t interest me.” At any rate, 2009 happens to be the same year that Assad turned down Qatar’s pipeline deal. Taking Dumas’s anecdote as evidence of early covert operations on the part of NATO is not a “conspiracy theory”. In fact, to dismiss that conclusion as Western chauvinism would be to endorse the most extreme “coincidence theory” imaginable.

While the interests of the US, as the global military and economic superpower, also include the profits of US-based multinationals like ExxonMobil, they are a bit different. For decades, the linchpin of US policy in the Middle East has been control over energy resources. From the perspective of the US, this means preventing Iran’s rise as a regional power, which threatens not only US dominance, but also that of its closest allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

What does this strategy entail in an era when the US is less and less able to maintain hegemony through purely economic means? Maybe the most revealing illustration is the infamous 2001 Bush memo, recounted by retired Gen. Wesley Clark in 2007, which supposedly described the administration’s plans for regime change “starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.” As we now know, it didn’t take long for the US to depose Saddam and plunge Iraq into the carnage that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the US’s Lebanon problem worked itself out politically, at least for a time.

But It wasn’t until permanent war got a “liberal” makeover under Obama that the neoconservative dream of military intervention in Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria became a reality. In Libya, a seven-month NATO bombing campaign ended in the assassination of that country’s leader and increased the conflict’s death toll by tens of thousands. The administration has stepped up its drone attacks and proxy fighting in Somalia, and deployed troops to the south of Sudan (which has since seceded).

In Syria, NATO’s military intervention has thus far taken two forms: Directly, through the training and arming of rebel fighters, and indirectly, through Turkey, Qatar, and the Saudis. At this point, some object that the US only supports the good, “moderate” factions within the armed opposition, whereas the bad, “extremist” rebels get their training and weapons from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. But it’s simply a matter of fact that most of Saudi Arabia’s arms are supplied by the US, the UK, and France. President Obama knows very well that they are used for the most brutal repression – not just in Syria and Bahrain, but at home as well.

Meanwhile, Qatar has the second smallest military in the Middle East: It gets 80% of its weapons from France, and plays host to a key US command center for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A negotiated, enforced arms embargo is still the first course of action to protect civilian lives, but it doesn’t seem to have occurred to the Nobel Peace Prize winning humanitarian in the White House.

None of this is to say that ordinary Syrians don’t have legitimate reasons for armed struggle against their government. On the contrary, they deserve more solidarity than we in the US and Europe have bothered to show. But “solidarity” doesn’t oblige us to pretend that what’s happening in Syria is a revolution in any meaningful sense. It obliges us to call the transnational elite’s wars, covert or otherwise, by their real name: Mass murder.

It’s not about some Evil American Empire that is always to blame for everything. The struggle of Syrians is the struggle of the poor, the colonized, who are crushed time and time again by the teetering balance of power: the blood sacrifice of capital. While we debate whether or not it denies Syrians “agency” to highlight the determining role of economic and geopolitical forces in this catastrophe – while we wring our hands at the prospect of “doing nothing” – our governments, their allies, and their enemies make a mockery of the Syrian people’s agency, and ours.